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The Unconstitutionality of Class-Based Statutory
Limitations on Presidential Nominations:
Can a Man Head the Women's Bureau at the
Department of Labor?
Donald J. Kochan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Can a man be the Director of the Women's Bureau at the Department
of Labor? According to Congress, the answer is no.'
This article addresses the 1920 statute requiring that the President
nominate a woman to head the Women's Bureau at the Department of
Labor ("Women's Bureau").2 Although this may make sense as a
policy matter,3 the consequences of the statute are problematic and raise
two key questions: (1) even if it makes sense on policy grounds to
appoint a woman to head the Women's Bureau, is it constitutional to
mandate it? and (2) if we accept this statutory limitation on the
President's power, what are the potential precedential consequences for
other appointment matters?
As a result, this Article considers whether Congress may
constitutionally remove the President's discretion to choose his
nominees, regardless of their sex, race, class, or other characteristics.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated:
[AIll officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance
with the [Appointments] Clause. Principal officers are selected by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Inferior officers
Congress may allow to be appointed by the President alone, by the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. B.A. 1995 Western Michigan
University; J.D. 1998 Cornell Law School. Former Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, George
Mason University School of Law, 2002-2003; Olin Research Fellow, University of Virginia
School of Law, 2003-2004. Appreciation is extended to Trina White for helpful comments.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 12 (2000).
2. Id.
3. There are undoubtedly many compelling policy reasons why a President would choose to
appoint a woman to direct the Bureau, but whether a woman should be appointed to head the
Women's Bureau is outside the scope of this Article.
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heads of departments, or by the Judiciary. No class or type of officer
is excluded because of its special functions.4
Class-based policy preferences, however wise for the special
functions of a position, simply cannot become class-based statutory
restrictions under the Constitution. As legal scholars have posited, even
minor and perhaps inconsequential intrusions may have significant
precedential effects that present dangers to the separation of powers and
the Republic itself:
The fact of the matter is that, given the protean nature of political
power, members of one branch can accumulate dangerous powers over
time without the other branches noticing it. Worse yet, when the other
branches notice the danger, they may not be able to either remedy the
harm already caused or effectively stop the now all-powerful branch
from abusing its powers. To prevent one branch, particularly the
dangerous legislature, from accumulating these powers over time, the
court must articulate and enforce prophylactic rules against the first
encroachment upon the powers of another branch, even if that
encroachment seems small or especially useful under the
circumstances.'
Although the Senate may refuse its advice and consent to anyone
nominated by the President, the Constitution clearly prohibits Congress
from placing restrictions on who the President may present to the Senate
for appointment.
6
In an era where presidential appointments have elicited heated
debate,7 perhaps these concerns have heightened significance. These
4. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1978) (second emphasis added).
5. Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Constitutional Law: The Garvee Bonds Case and Executive
Power: Breakthrough or Blip?, 56 OKLA. L. REv. 327, 346 (2003) (footnote omitted).
6. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252, 274 (1991) (stating Congress is subject to the "basic" restraint that "[ilt may not 'invest
itself or its Members with either executive power or judicial power"').
7. See, e.g., Mike Madden, Frist's Leadership to be Tested, TENNESSEAN, July 20, 2005, at 1
(discussing Senator Bill Frist's role in the U.S. Supreme Court confirmation hearings for John G.
Roberts); Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, § 6, at 38 (describing the
Democrats' defense of the filibuster to block nominations); David T. Canon, Move Over, Buster
There's Nothing Sacred About the Rules Regarding Filibusters, Wis. ST. J., July 3, 2005, at B 1
(discussing alternatives to changing the Senate filibuster rule); Frank James & Mike Doming,
Bracing for a Nomination Battle like No Other, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 2005, at 12 (highlighting
conservative efforts in the fight over Supreme Court nominee John G. Roberts); Editorial,
Battling Over Bolton, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 23, 2005, at B6 (discussing the nomination of John
Bolton as Ambassador to the United Nations); Mark Preston, Comity in the Senate: The Divisions
Are Worse Now. Or Are They?, ROLL CALL, June 16, 2005 (discussing the Senate battles over
President Bush's judicial nominations); John Stanton, Frist, Reid Prep For Supreme Court Clash,
CONG. DAILY, June 10, 2005 (discussing nomination of John G. Roberts); Both Sides Prepare for
War Over Top Court Nominations, STAR-LEDGER, June 10, 2005, at 16 (discussing battles over
court nominations).
[Vol. 37
2005] Limitations on Presidential Nominations 45
concerns hold particular interest as there is a growing trend toward a
clash between the Executive branch and Congress on judicial
nominations. For example, as Senator John McCain recently stated, "I
do believe this issue of [the appointment and confirmation of] judges is
a hot issue."' But the Appointments Clause touches on far more than
judicial nominations, reaching all high-level federal positions. With
that in mind, in the face of current controversies and attempts to find
political means to create obstacles or conditions on appointments, this
Article examines just how far Congress can go to limit the discretion of
Executive authority. Much focus has been placed on senatorial power
to block nominations or otherwise thwart presidential preferences
through advice and consent functions. 9 This Article, however, examines
the statutory ability to, ex ante, limit the President's choice of nominees.
This Article first discusses the background of the Women's Bureau at
the Department of Labor and highlights the Bureau's mission.0 This
Article next examines the role of the Senate and Congress in
establishing the pre-selection criteria for presidential nominees and cites
to the Framers, namely James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, in
discussing the proper roles of the President and Congress." Can sex,
race, sexual orientation, economic status, political party affiliation,
ACLU membership, Federalist Society membership, NRA membership
or other class distinctions-no matter how presumptively reasonable on
policy grounds-be statutorily mandated (or prohibited) to limit the
discretion of presidential nominations for any particular position for
officers of the United States? 2 Such class-based preferences can be
taken into account in considering whether the Senate will provide its
advice and consent to any particular nomination, 3  but it is
8. Craig Gordon, Schiavo Case sets up Judicial Fight: Will Judges be Impeached? Will the
Senate go to the 'Nuclear Option'?, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 3, 2005, at All (emphasis
added). Discussing recent conflicts over judicial appointments, Eastman has stated: "The text of
the [Appointments] clause itself thus demonstrates that the role envisioned for the Senate was a
much more limited one than is currently claimed." John C. Eastman, The Limited Nature of the
Senate's Advice and Consent Role, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 633, 640 (2003).
9. See generally Eastman, supra note 8 (citing recent articles on the Senate's role in the
nomination process).
10. See infra Part H (discussing background of Women's Bureau and the appointment of its
directors).
11. See infra Part III (examining the role of governmental bodies in forming pre-selection
criteria for nominees).
12. "Assessing a candidate's 'qualifications for office' did not give the Senate grounds for
imposing an ideological litmus on the President's nominees, at least where the questioned
ideology did not prevent a judge from fulfilling his oath of office." Eastman, supra note 8, at
647.
13. "[T]he Executive & Senate in the cases of appointments to Office ... are to be considered
as independent of and co-ordinate with each other. If they agree the appointments.., are made. If
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unconstitutional to place such class-based preferences in statutory, pre-
nomination mandates and restrictions. Thus, this Article argues that
class preferences belong in the decision whether to provide advice and
consent and not in pre-nomination statutory restrictions.
14
This Article next uses one example, the statutory pre-nomination
limitation regarding the Women's Bureau, to demonstrate the
illegitimacy of class-based statutory limitations on the President's
nomination power. 5 The place for the invocation of preferences is in
the post-nomination/advice and consent process-not in statutory
mandates. This Article then posits that the prohibition of class
restrictions presents little danger to meeting congressional or public
preference.1
6
This Article concludes that the Constitution precludes Congress from
placing limitations on the presidential nomination power and provides
that Congress cannot require that a nominee meet specific criteria. 7
The Senate may exercise its advice and consent power to disapprove of
any candidate based on the Senate's own class preferences, but
mandatory, statutory pre-nomination limitations are simply beyond the
Senate's advice and consent power.
II. THE WOMEN'S BUREAU AND THE APPOINTMENT OF ITS DIRECTOR
In 1920, just as the States were ratifying the Nineteenth Amendment
to guarantee nondiscriminatory suffrage, Congress created the Women's
Bureau. Ironically, in establishing the position of its Director, Congress
discriminated on the basis of sex-requiring that the Director be "a
woman.., appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate."'" Policy concerns regarding equal protection
may themselves justify voiding this 85-year old quota. However, this
the Senate disagree they fail." 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 250-51 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1900-1910).
14. Eastman, supra note 8, at 640 ("As the text of the provision makes explicitly clear, the
power to choose nominees-to 'nominate'-is vested solely in the President."). See infra Part II
(discussing pre-nomination criteria); see also Eastman, supra note 8, at 644 ("In short, by
assigning the sole power to nominate... to the President, the [Constitutional] Convention
specifically rejected a more expansive Senate role. The delegates believed that providing the
Senate with such a role would undermine the President's responsibility...").
15. See infra Part III (demonstrating the illegitimacy of statutory limitations on the President's
nomination power).
16. See infra Part IV (stating that prohibiting statutory class restrictions on nominations would
not prevent the public interest being served).
17. See infra Part IV (discussing the constitutional limitations on Congress's power).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 12 (2000) (emphasis added). The Director appointment provision was first
passed in the statute establishing the Women's Bureau, and it has never been amended. Act of
June 5, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-259, 41 Stat. 987.
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Article raises a more fundamental issue regarding the constitutional
separation of powers:' 9 whether Congress may, by statute, limit the class
of persons the President may nominate under his Appointments Clause
power.2 °
According to its website, "the Women's Bureau is the single unit at
the [federal government level exclusively concerned with serving and
promoting the interests of working women.' The provision for the
appointment of the Director of the Women's Bureau states that "[t]he
Women's Bureau shall be in charge of a director, a woman, to be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. 22
By its plain terms, this provision creates the Director position but
precludes the President from appointing a male to run the Women's
Bureau. 3 It statutorily disqualifies all men from holding the position.
There have been fifteen Directors, as one would expect from the text, all
women, since the Bureau was created in 1920.24
I. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL INTRUSIONS
ON PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
"[W]ith admirable clarity, ' '25 the text of the Appointments Clause
bifurcates the roles of the President and Senate and vests the choice of a
nominee for a position as an officer of the United States solely with the
19. "The principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the
minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the
summer of 1787." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976). See also id. at 271 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the Appointments Clause as "a major
building block" in the separation of powers).
20. "The Appointments Clause has been held to provide the exclusive constitutional means for
appointment of officers of the United States." Gordon G. Young, Federal Maritime Commission
v. South Carolina State Ports Authority: Small Iceberg or Just the Tip?, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 971,
1001 n.156 (2003) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139-40 (1976)).
21. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE WOMEN'S BUREAU: AN OVERVIEW
1970-2000, available at http://www.dol.gov/wb/infoabout_wb/interwb2.htm; see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 13 (2000) (setting out the statutory powers and duties of the Women's Bureau).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 12 (2000).
23. Interestingly, Congress placed no gender restriction on the Assistant Director of the
Women's Bureau, an inferior position filled through appointment by the Secretary of Labor. See
29 U.S.C. § 14 (2000) (prescribing the manner of appointment of the Assistant Director).
24. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DIRECTORS GALLERY, available at
http://www.dol.gov/wb/edu/gallery.htm.
25. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 487 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("The President's power to nominate principal officers falls within the line of cases in which a
balancing approach is inapplicable .... The President has the sole responsibility for nominating
these officials, and the Senate has the sole responsibility of consenting to the President's
choice.").
2005]
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26President. The Appointments Clause of the Constitution provides that
the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other [o]fficers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law
vest the Appointment of such inferior [o]fficers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.27
The text clearly indicates that the Framers of the Constitution
intended for the Senate and the President to have separate and distinct,
yet interdependent roles in the appointment of officers.28
It was intended that the Constitution would govern appointments with
divided but defined powers, each serving independent yet coordinate
influences on the choice and presentation of nominees as well as their
29ultimate success in rising to a particular position. In considering these
principles, the United States Supreme Court has explained: "Neither
Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive this structural
protection .... The structural interests protected by the Appointments
Clause are not those of any one branch of Government but of the entire
Republic. 3 °  Such structural protections are key to the constitutional
separation of powers.
26. "The core concern of the Appointments Clause is to ensure that executive power remains
independent." Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 1479, 1487
(D. Or. 1994); see also Brian P. McClatchey, Note, A Whole New Game: Recognizing the
Changing Complexion of Indian Gaming by Removing the "Governor's Veto" for Gaming on
"After-Acquired Lands," 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 1227, 1250-51 (2004) ("The federal system
depends, in part, upon assurances that the legitimate exercise of power by each branch will be
undisturbed by the others.").
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
28. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 267-82 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). "[N]o case in this Court even remotely supports the power of Congress to
appoint an officer of the United States aside from those officers each House is authorized by Art.
I to appoint to assist in the legislative processes." Id. at 275. See generally MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2000) (describing the selection and
appointment of United States officials).
29. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 275 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128-129 (1926)).
Congress clearly has the power to create federal offices and to define the powers and
duties of those offices. .. but no case in this Court even remotely supports the power
of Congress to appoint an officer of the United States aside from those officers each
House is authorized by Art. I to appoint to assist in the legislative processes.
Id. (emphasis added).
30. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991) (holding that a special trial judge
must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause).
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Substantial history from the drafting of the Appointments Clause
indicates that the President was not to be constrained in his choice of
persons to nominate. Likewise, the Senate could, constitutionally, reject
any nominee without constraint.3" As Justice Byron White explained,
"[t]he decision to give the President the exclusive power to initiate
appointments was thoughtful and deliberate. 32 James Madison further
explained that "while there was some admixture, the Constitution was
nonetheless true to Montesquieu's well-known maxim that the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments ought to be separate and
distinct."33  The separation of the nomination power and prerogative
from the advice and consent power is a quintessential example of that
admixture. 4 There is not "hermetic sealing off"'35 of the powers of
appointment between the President and the Senate but identifiable
separations that should be recognized and respected.36
Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 66 that the Senate
has no proper role in restricting the President's choice of nominees for
an officer position created by Congress:
It will be the office of the President to nominate, and with the advice
and consent of the senate to appoint. There will of course be no
exertion of choice on the part of the Senate. They may defeat one
choice of the executive, and oblige him to make another; but they
31. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Revolution That Wasn't, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 47 (2004)
(discussing the static nature of separation of powers jurisprudence during the Rehnquist court);
Spiropoulos, supra note 5, at 344 (discussing the holding in Buckley that the legislature cannot
appoint officers of the United States); see also William J. Wagner, Balancing as Art: Justice
White and the Separation of Powers, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 957, 960 n.12 (2003).
The language of the Appointments Clause was not mere inadvertence. The Framers
repeatedly debated the matter of the appointment of officers of the new Federal
Government. They reached the final formulation of the Clause only after the most
careful debate and consideration of its place in the overall design of government.
Id. (quoting Justice White in Buckley, 421 U.S. at 271).
32. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 272 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added); see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 81 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) (statements of Edmund Randolph) ("Appointments by the Legislatures have generally
resulted from cabal, from personal regard, or some other consideration than a title derived from
the proper qualifications.").
33. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 120 (Majority Opinion).
34. According to Madison, the Senate was "joined with the President in appointing to
office... merely for the sake of advising." JAMES MADISON, Speech in Congress on the
Removal Power, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 434, 436 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). He
continued that "no person can be forced upon [the President] as an assistant by any other branch
of government." Id.
35. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121.
36. Id. at 281 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[lit has not been insisted
that the commands of the Appointments Clause must also yield to permit congressional
appointments of members of a major agency.").
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cannot themselves choose-they can only ratify or reject the choice, of
the President.37
Justice David Souter has stated, "Hamilton's Federalist Papers
writings contain the most thorough contemporary justification for the
method of appointing principal officers that the Framers adopted.
3 8
Justice Souter continued that "Hamilton was clear that the President
ought initially to select principal officers and that the President was
therefore rightly given the sole power to nominate[.] ' 39  Hamilton
explained that there was indeed a purpose and desire behind separating
nominating power and advice and consent. 4°
As Hamilton further explained, allowing a President full and sole
authority in the nomination was not dangerous because reputational
factors (and the risk of not receiving advice and consent) would be an
adequate incentive to make prudent choices for his nominees:
The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget
a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will
on this account feel himself under stronger obligations, and more
interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations
to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the persons who may have
the fairest pretentions to them.
4 1
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 449 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). As
one author noted the use of The Federalists by modem politicians to limit the Senate's role in
nominations:
Hamilton believed that the President, acting alone, would be the better choice for
making nominations, as he would be less vulnerable to personal considerations and
political negotiations than the Senate and more inclined, as the sole decision maker, to
select nominees who would reflect well on the presidency. The Senate's role, by
comparison, would be to act as a powerful check on 'unfit' nominees by the President.
Emery G. Lee III, The Federalist in an Age of Faction: Rethinking Federalist No. 76 on the
Senate's Role in the Judicial Confirmation Process, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 235, 242 (2004)
(quoting Senator Orrin Hatch); see also Orrin G. Hatch, At Last a Look at the Facts: The Truth
About the Judicial Selection Process: Each Is Entitled to His Own Opinion, But Not to His Own
Facts, 11 GEO. MASON L. REv. 467, 472-73 (2003) (agreeing with Hamilton that the
Constitution grants the power of appointments solely to the president).
38. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 185 n.1 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. For instance, as Eastman has written:
Note the very limited role that the Senate serves in Hamilton's view.. . the element of
choice--the essence of the power to fill the office-belongs to the President alone.
The Senate has the power to refuse nominees, but in the Constitutional scheme it has
no proper authority in picking the nominees-either through direct choice or through
logrolling and deal-making.
Eastman, supra note 8, at 644-45.
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 510-11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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Based on these principles, the Senate could defeat every man that the
President might nominate as an officer, including every man nominated
to become director of the Women's Bureau, but they cannot invade the
province of the Executive by statutorily prohibiting the nomination of a
42
man.
Finally, the Framers knew how to limit the President's nomination
power when deemed necessary.43 An additional basis for concluding
that the President alone has discretion in choosing a nominee for an
officer derives from a time-honored principle of statutory construction,
expression unius est exclusio alterius-the expression of one is the
exclusion of others. Based on this maxim, the designation of sole
presidential power in the act of nomination means that no others have
been granted any constitutional power to be involved in the "choice"
aspect of nominations. This maxim underscores the idea of both a
limited government-no person has more power than they are granted,
and the separation of powers-no branch has more than they are
granted. So, by expressing that the President shall nominate excludes
the others from choice in that process, and in this example makes a
congressional statutory choice of a woman for the Women's Bureau
violates that maxim.
The Constitution itself creates one limit on the President's power to
choose a nominee in the Emoluments and Incompatibility Clauses.44
These clauses state:
42. See Eastman, supra note 8, at 640 ("As the text of the [Appointments Clause] makes
explicitly clear, the power to choose nominees-to 'nominate'-is vested solely in the President.
The President also has the primary role to 'appoint,' albeit with the advice and consent of the
Senate.") (footnote omitted); see also Spiropoulos, supra note 5, at 345 ("It is clear, then, that the
Court has constructed a set of high, formal barriers around the exercise of purely executive
powers. The Court has decided that under no circumstances will legislators be allowed to: (1)
appoint officers who exercise executive functions; (2) remove these officers; or (3) exercise
executive functions themselves.").
43. See Laura T. Gorjanc, The Solution to the Filibuster Problem: Putting the Advice Back in
Advice and Consent, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1435, 1452 (2004) ("[T]he Framers intended their
compromise to divide the appointment power between the President and the Senate, with neither
taking a greater slice of the appointment power pie.").
44. Justice White explained:
From the very outset, provision was made to prohibit members of Congress from
holding office in another branch of the Government while also serving in Congress.
There was little if any dispute about this incompatibility provision which survived in
Art. I, § 6, of the Constitution as finally ratified. Today, no person may serve in
Congress and at the same time be Attorney General, Secretary of State, a member of
the judiciary, a United States attorney, or a member of the Federal Trade Commission
or the National Labor Relations Board.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 272 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote
omitted).
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No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the
United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments
whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of
either House during his Continuance in Office.45
This enumeration of one limitation on the class of eligible nominees
as officers of the United States excludes the presumption that any other
• • 46
limitations exist on the President's choice in making nominations.
A. Unconstitutional Intrusions by the Senate
As Professor John Yoo has stated, "[w]hile the Senate may reject
nominees.., it is quite clear that the Senate cannot choose them,
contrary to suggestions made by some scholars. 4 7 Similarly, Senators
could informally express their view that a woman should be appointed
for a position, but they cannot statutorily require it. As Senator Orrin
Hatch has explained:
Hamilton... further pointed out that the Senate does not have the
power to choose officeholders, but only to advise and consent. He felt
that Senators might have political reasons for confirming or rejecting a
nominee, but observed the fact that because the President alone makes
the nominations, Senators would be somewhat constrained in their
voting decisions and that self-interested decisions would be offset by
other Senators. Voting decisions on the merits would become much
more the norm. Elsewhere, Hamilton asserted that the appointments
powers have been wisely vested in the hands of two parties, the
President and the Senate.
4
By placing class restrictions in a statute authorizing an officer
position, the Senate is unconstitutionally exerting the type of choice that
Hamilton explained was prohibited.49  In Federalist No. 76, Hamilton
articulated this concept:
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
46. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 484 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (making a similar argument).
47. John C. Yoo, Criticizing Judges, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 277, 284 (1998) (emphasis added); see
also, Eastman, supra note 8, at 645 ("Placing the nomination power in the President alone would,
[Hamilton] argued, cut down on the degree to which political bargains in the Senate influenced
the choice of candidates because... all would understand that the power of appointment
belonged to the President alone.") (emphasis added).
48. Hatch, supra note 37, at 470-71 (footnote omitted). 'The president is to nominate, and
thereby has the sole power to select for office[.]" JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1525 at 376 (1833) (emphasis added).
49. Senator Hatch explained Hamilton's argument as follows:
As [Hamilton] put it, "[t]he necessity of [the Senate's] concurrence would have a
[Vol. 37
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In the act of nomination [the President's] judgment alone would be
exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man, who
with the approbation of the Senate should fill an office, his
responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the final
appointment .... [E]very man who might be appointed would be in
fact his choice.
But might not [the President's] nomination be overruled? I grant it
might, yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by
[the President]. The person ultimately appointed must be the object of
his preference, though perhaps not in the first degree.5°
The President must have full control of, and accountability for, his
exercise of the nomination power granted to him in the Constitution.5'
Statutes such as the one creating the Director of the Women's Bureau
unconstitutionally trespass upon the President's exercise of that power.52
These intrusions may seem inconsequential, limited, and perhaps of
little significance. But, "short of an overt coup, such accretion [of
power] need not be-indeed, is unlikely to be-of a dramatic form.
powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a
spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment
of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal
attachment, or from a view to popularity." In addition, he believed that the President's
reputation would be on the line when the Senate considered the nomination, and thus
better nominations would be the natural response from the President.
Hatch, supra note 37, at 471 (footnote omitted).
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
51. As Justice White stated in explaining the history of the Appointments Clause:
The language of the Appointments Clause was not mere inadvertence. The matter of
the appointment of officers of the new Federal Government was repeatedly debated by
the Framers, and the final formulation of the Clause arrived at only after the most
careful debate and consideration of its place in the overall design of government ....
The separation-of-powers principle was implemented by a series of provisions, among
which was the knowing decision that Congress was to have no power whatsoever to
appoint federal officers, except for the power of each House to appoint its own officers
serving in the strictly legislative processes and for the confirming power of the Senate
alone.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 271-72 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
52. It is worthwhile to note that another set of commentators reached a similar conclusion in
relation to statutory limitations on nominees in the Anti-Nepotism Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 3110
(2000) (precluding the nomination of a relative), the Solicitor General Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 505
(2000) (requiring that the Solicitor General be "learned in the law"), and the Federal
Communications Commission authorizing statute, 47 U.S.C. § 154 (2000 & West Supp. 2005)
(restricting the number of commissioners who may be of the same political party). See Richard P.
Wulwick & Frank J. Macchiarola, Congressional Interference with the President's Power to
Appoint, 24 STETSON L. REv. 625, 643-45 (1995) (arguing that restrictions on appointments
violate the Constitution).
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Rather, it may be almost microscopic, so that the naked eye will be
unable to perceive its occurrence."53
B. Unconstitutional Intrusions by the House of Representatives
Another troubling separation-of-powers concern that arises from
congressional limitations on the pool of officer nominees results from
the intrusion of the House of Representatives into the purely senatorial
function of "Advice and Consent. 5 4 Establishing an office "by Law
' 55
requires a bicameral act and presentment to the President. Therefore,
the Appointments Clause clearly contemplates the act of bicameralism
and presentment in the creation of an office. In contrast, the Advice and
Consent Clause is clearly limited to only one entity-the Senate.
By allowing Congress, as a whole, to place limitations on the
President's choice of a nominee for an office, the House of
Representatives intrudes upon senatorial and presidential prerogative by
itself engaging in pre-nomination advice. Therefore, in the case of the
Women's Bureau Director, the House has intermixed itself in the matter
of "choice." The statute limiting the Director to "a woman" involved
the bicameral action of the House and Senate.
Even if the Senate could be said to have some role in offering pre-
nomination advice,56 certainly the House does not. Duties committed
solely to one house of Congress cannot be exercised by the other. For
example, the Origination Clause,57 which requires that all bills for
53. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "if Angels Were to Govern": The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 464 (1991).
54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
55. Id.
56. For an excellent discussion of why the Senate has no constitutional pre-nomination role in
advice on judicial candidates, see generally John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the
Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 633 (1993). But see, e.g., Bush Gets Democrats' Pick for Supreme Court Slot, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., July 14, 2005, at 2 (describing the idea of "co-nomination" in presidential
appointees).
57. U.S. CONST. art I, §7, cl. 1. For a general discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992) (discussing bicameralism and
presentment in statute-making); J. Michael Medina, The Origination Clause in the American
Constitution: A Comparative Survey, 23 TULSA L.J. 165 (1987) (providing a comparative study
of the origination clause); Michael B. Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87
NW. U. L. REV. 735 (1993) (arguing that the constitution does not allow a presidential selective
veto); Adrian Vermuele, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
361 (2004) (suggesting reforms for internal legislative rules); Robert F. Williams, Comparative
Subnational Constitutional Law: South Africa's Provincial Constitutional Experiments, 40 S.
TEx. L. REV. 625 (1999) (providing a discussion of comparative subnational constitutional law).
See also Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV.
707 (1985) (supporting Congress's ability to perform constitutional analysis); Catherine Fisk &
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raising revenue must originate in the House of Representatives, makes
invalid any bills for raising revenue that originate in the Senate. 8 The
Appointments Clause similarly limits the advice and consent function to
the Senate and provides no room for formal House involvement. When
a statute is passed with a class limitation, however, the House has
necessarily been injected into the process of choice.
C. Unconstitutional Intrusions by Former Presidents
The same is true of the President who signs the legislation creating an
office with a restricted pool of eligible nominees and binds, therefore,
future Presidents to that nomination restriction. The President alone
actually makes the appointment to choose his nominee, and a prior
President can have no role in limiting that future President's class of
potential nominees. However, when presented with a bill and signing
it-like the Women's Bureau statute with a class limitation-the
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997) (arguing that modem filibuster
rules can and should be changed); Philip P. Frickey, Constitutional Law and Economics:
Constitutional Structure, Public Choice, and Public Law, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 163 (1992)
(exploring the use of the public choice perspective in approaching constitutional structure);
Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1277 (2001) (proposing reform in Congressional constitutional interpretation); James G.
Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially Unenforceable Rules That
Combine With Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to Regulate Political Behavior, 40 BUFF. L.
REV. 645 (1992) (discussing the potential value of American constitutional conventions).
58. See generally Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (noting the requirement of the
Origination Clause that revenue bills originate in the House); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863
F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating law as a violation of the Origination Clause). For a number
of other cases discussing the Origination Clause, see generally the following: Walthall v. United
States, 131 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
does not violate the Origination Clause); United States v. Dugan, 912 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a special assessment statute is not a revenue raising measure under the Origination
Clause); United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 1000 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (holding that the special
assessment statute was not designed for revenue, but rather was a part of a comprehensive scheme
to assist victims); United States v. Michael, 894 F.2d 1457 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a statute
that charges a criminal defendant who pleads guilty to a special assessment does not violate the
Origination Clause); United States v. Tholl, 895 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding the special
assessment statute as not a violation of the Origination Clause); United States v. King, 891 F.2d
780 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the special assessment statute is not subject to constitutional
challenge under the Origination Clause because the statute's purpose is not to raise revenue);
United States v. Newman, 889 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1989) (determining that a statute may be
challenged under the Origination Clause if it is designed to raise revenue); United States v.
Simpson, 885 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that the Victims of Crime Act was not intended to
raise revenue and is not subject to challenge under the Origination Clause); United States v.
Griffin, 884 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding the special assessment statute because it is not
intended to raise revenue); State v. Block, 717 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1949 is a regulation, not a tax, and does not violate the
Origination Clause); Bertelsen v. White, 65 F.2d 719 (1st Cir.1933) (holding that the Merchant
Marine Act is not a revenue act and does not violate the Origination Clause).
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signatory President has acquiesced in an unconstitutional statutory
limitation on future presidential appointments' powers.
Each President should be entitled to his own prerogative in making
appointments to his administration. If a prior President can tie the
hands of a future President he intrudes upon that discretion and
exercises inappropriate and extra-constitutional control. Thus, by
signing a statute that binds the nominational discretion normally
afforded a future President, a President oversteps the temporal power
afforded in his term.
IV. PROHIBITING STATUTORY CLASS RESTRICTIONS ON NOMINEES
PRESENTS LITTLE DANGER IN FULFILLING CONGRESSIONAL OR PUBLIC
PREFERENCES
Even absent the statutory restriction, one should not be surprised that
the position of Director of the Women's Bureau has been filled by a
woman and expect it likely always will be so filled.5" It is anticipated
that the structure of the appointments process compels the President to
make proper choices in his nominees. 60  Nonetheless, far from being
"harmless error," the Women's Bureau appointment provision reflects a
fundamental encroachment on presidential prerogatives established in
the Constitution, sets poor precedent, and should be amended by
Congress.6'
59. See, e.g., Gorjanc, supra note 43, at 1451-52. Gorjanc notes:
Hamilton argued that the Appointments Clause limits the Senate insofar as the
President always has the power to choose a nominee. According to Hamilton, even
though the Senate may reject that nominee, the President always has the power to
choose another nominee. Thus, the fact that the Senate has the advice and consent
power does not diminish the President's power to nominate. Yet, as Hamilton
observed, the possibility of the Senate rejecting a nominee should affect the President's
choice.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
60. See, e.g,. Eastman, supra note 8, at 646 ("To Adams, the President should be solely
responsible for his choices, and should alone pay the price for choosing unfit nominees."). "His
own office, his own character, his own fortune should be responsible." James Wilson, Lectures
on Law (1791), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 110, 110 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
61. One might argue that the position itself, as currently constituted, is unconstitutional. Of
course, the courts might very well find that the unconstitutional component, the words "a
woman," are severable from the remainder of the position. On severability law, see e.g.,
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm. Of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932) ("Unless it is evident
that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power,
independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully
operative as a law."). Especially because it is unlikely anyone would ever have standing to
challenge the statute, it is Congress's responsibility to correct its error.
Limitations on Presidential Nominations
As Spiropoulos has noted, strong protections of the role of the
Executive in the appointments power, even against seemingly small or
useful intrusions on the Executive's power to choose freely his
nominees, is essential to the functioning of the constitutional system:
[A]rticulating strong formal rules against the usurpation of the powers
of another branch has a great value, aside from facilitating the judicial
invalidation of legislative overreaching. The fact of the matter is that,
given the protean nature of political power, members of one branch
can accumulate dangerous powers over time without the other
branches noticing it.
62
He continues that even small or seemingly harmless encroachments
must be guarded against lest the structure of power lean away from its
intended separation:
Worse yet, when the other branches notice the danger, they may not
be able to either remedy the harm already caused or effectively stop
the now all-powerful branch from abusing its powers. To prevent one
branch, particularly the dangerous legislature, from accumulating
these powers over time, the court must articulate and enforce
prophylactic rules against the first encroachment upon the powers of
another branch, even if that encroachment seems small or especially
useful under the circumstances.63
Thus, even if the encroachment in the Women's Bureau statute seems
small, it is significant.
As the concurring Justices of the Supreme Court concluded in Public
Citizen, "where the Constitution by explicit text commits the power at
issue to the exclusive control of the President, we have refused to
tolerate any intrusion by the Legislative Branch." 64 It should not be
tolerated for the appointment of the Director of the Women's Bureau.
The invalidity of the Women's Bureau statute has implications
beyond just the Department of Labor. Just imagine the havoc Congress
might wreak if it believed it had the power to broadly restrict
presidential nominations to certain sexes or other classes of persons.
Admittedly, this is not the only instance where Congress has tried to
limit the pool of prospective nominees by statute or placed
46 65
"qualification" requirements in appointment statutes. Because
62. Spiropoulos, supra note 5, at 346.
63. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
64. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 485 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
see also id. at 487 (noting that the three branches need not be "entirely separate and distinct ....
[b]ut as to the particular divisions of power that the Constitution does in fact draw, we are without
authority to alter them, and indeed we are empowered to act in particular cases to prevent any
other Branch from undertaking to alter them").
65. See Wulwick & Macchiarola, supra note 52, at 626 & n.5 (listing statutes that attempt to
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political pressures and policy reasons will likely compel future
Presidents to nominate a woman to head the Women's Bureau,66 the
probable policy preferences supporting the Sixty-Sixth Congress's
decision to create the unconstitutional mandate--ensuring that a female
runs the Bureau-is likely to go undisturbed by a statutory amendment
67
removing the gender restriction from the appointments provision.
Presidents generally can be held accountable for their unwise
decisions.68
As Hamilton wisely observed, placing the sole power of nomination
in the hands of the President will also constrain him, for "[t]he
possibility of rejection would be a strong motive to care in proposing. 69
place restrictions on the President's Appointments Clause power, including those that identify
particular professional qualifications, experience, or skills). This author is not, however, aware of
any other appointments statutes that create sex or class limitations.
66. Goijanc, supra note 43, at 1453 ("The President is not bound by the Senate's advice, but
at maximum, the Appointments Clause allows the Senate to give the President advice on whom to
nominate."). It is difficult to contemplate public acceptance of naming a man to head the
Women's Bureau, and in recognition of that fact, most politicians would be unlikely to be willing
to face claims of chauvinism or others by naming a man to head the post.
67. Id at 1452. "[A]s Hamilton observed, the possibility of the Senate rejecting a nominee
should affect the President's choice[,]" meaning that a President would use prudence in his choice
due to the qualities necessary and the consequences of his decision politically.
68. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 8, at 641-42 (recounting National Ghorum's argument that
"while if the appointment power were given to the President alone, 'the Executive would
certainly be more answerable for a good appointment, as the whole blame of a bad one would fall
on him alone."') (quoting THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 32,
at 41).
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I answer that the
necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though in general a silent
operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President,
and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State
prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to
popularity.
Id. Justice Souter has provided further analysis that policy objectives and the check on
inappropriate nominations underscore the Framers' purpose for requiring Senate approval and
that unfettered authority of the President to nominate did not mean that he would make unwise
choices because the Senate could hold him accountable:
The same notes were struck in the Constitutional Convention, where Hamilton was
actually the first to suggest that both the President and the Senate be involved in the
appointments process. See 1 Farrand 128; J. Harris, The Advice and Consent of the
Senate 21 (1953). For example, Gouvernor Morris, who was among those initially
favoring vesting exclusive appointment power in the President, see 2 Farrand 82, 389,
ultimately defended the assignment of shared authority for appointment on the ground
that "as the President was to nominate, there would be responsibility, and as the Senate
was to concur, there would be security." Id., at 539. See also 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the
Federal Constitution 134 (1891) (James Iredell in North Carolina ratifying convention)
("[Tlhe Senate has no other influence but a restraint on improper appointments ....
[The Appointments Clause provides] a double security"). See generally Harris, supra,
Limitations on Presidential Nominations
As with the Women's Bureau, other posts should receive the same
reflection in order for a political President to avoid unnecessary
entanglements with the Senate or his voting public.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress should take action to remove this restriction from the
Women's Bureau statute and any similar laws that run afoul of the
Constitution's limitation on the congressional role in the appointments
process. "[B]oth Congress and the courts have a parallel responsibility
to interpret the Constitution in the performance of their institutional
duties and in upholding the text as supreme law."70  Not only is it
Congress's constitutional obligation, but it would also provide an
opportunity to underscore an important principle regarding the
separation of powers.
The policy objective can be achieved while cleansing the statute of its
constitutional infirmities, for any strong preference is likely to affect the
President's choice of a nominee and any defection from such
preferences will lead to negative political consequences. 71 Political
appointments are transparent and subject to public scrutiny.72
Providence and prudence73 will undoubtedly ensure that the policy goal
of having a female run the Women's Bureau will almost without
question continue to be fulfilled if "a woman" is removed from
at 17-26 (summarizing debates in the Constitutional Convention and in the ratifying
conventions).
Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 185 n.1 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (alterations in
original).
70. Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A
Preliminary Inquiry Into Legislative Attitudes, 1959-2001, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 127, 134
(2004).
71. "As to offices, the Senate has no other influence but a restraint on improper
appointments .... This, in effect, is but a restriction on the President." James Iredell, Debate in
North Carolina Ratifying Convention, 28 July 1788, in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 102,
102 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
72. "If [the President] should... surrender the public patronage into the hands of profligate
men, or low adventurers, it [would] be impossible for him long to retain public favour .... At all
events, he would be less likely to disregard [public disapprobation] .... STORY, supra note 48,
§ 1523, at 375-76 (1833).
73. As the Supreme Court majority in Buckley explained, quoting Madison:
We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the
constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each
may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a
sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in
the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122-23 (1976) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323-24
(James Madison) (G.P. Putnam's Sons ed., 1908)).
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Women's Bureau appointment
constitutionally infirm provision
mischief in the United States Code.
statute
74
or possible
without leaving a
precedent for future
74. Justice Souter explained this political "check" on presidential nominations:
In the Framers' thinking, the process on which they settled for selecting principal
officers would ensure "judicious" appointments not only by empowering the President
and the Senate to check each other, but also by allowing the public to hold the
President and Senators accountable for injudicious appointments.
Weiss, 510 U.S. at 186 (Souter, J., concurring). Souter continued to explain that the Framers
believed that transparency of presidential decisions should quell imprudent ones:
"[T]he circumstances attending an appointment [of a principal officer], from the mode
of conducting it, would naturally become matters of notoriety," Hamilton wrote; "and
the public would be at no loss to determine what part had been performed by the
different actors." The Federalist No. 77, at 517. As a result,
"[tihe blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and
absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of
the senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good
intentions of the executive. If an ill appointment should be made the executive
for nominating and the senate for approving would participate though in different
degrees in the opprobrium and disgrace." Ibid.
The strategy by which the Framers sought to ensure judicious appointments of
principal officers is, then, familiar enough: the Appointments Clause separates the
Government's power but also provides for a degree of intermingling, all to ensure
accountability and "preclude the exercise of arbitrary power." Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, I., dissenting).
Weiss, 510 U.S. at 186 (Souter, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
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